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Abstract
We study the eﬃciency and the liquidity properties of a centralized, non-anonymous ﬂoor market
where asymmetrically informed traders are active for two periods and can observe each other current
and past orders. We show that the more precise the information the lower the incentive to reveal it
in the ﬁrst trading rounds. On the contrary, strategic competition pushes the less informed trader
to reveal his information in the earliest stage. This implies that when diﬀerences in information
quality are very important, the liquidity of the market decreases as we approach the date of public
revelation. We are able to show that more transparent markets as the ones organized via electronic
systems are not performing better than markets organized on anonymous ﬂoor trades in terms of
revelation of information, due to the oligopolistic behavior of insiders.
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11 Introduction
Electronic, non-anonymous quotation systems like the Toronto Stock Exchange CATS (Computer
Assisted Trading System) have remarkable importance in terms of volume of trade. Their increasing
practical relevance has lead microstructure theorists to study pre-trade transparency. In this literature,
the broad conclusion seems to be that non-anonymous systems bring more informative prices and
lower trading costs by allowing for widely spread information about investors’ demands (with respect
to anonymous ﬂoor systems). This belief is also shared by some regulators like the US Security and
Exchange Commission or the UK Oﬃce of Fair Trading.
In this paper we argue that strong asymmetries of information may generate ineﬃcient price
dynamics which could explain the observed increase of trading cost before a public announcement
(e.g., earnings or dividends). From this result we can then derive conditions under which the high
degree of transparency of electronic systems is not beneﬁcial in terms of reduced costs of trading
or for informational eﬃciency. Madhavan, Porter and Weaver (2000) ﬁnd related empirical evidence
for the Toronto Stock Exchange. They analyze the eﬀects of the introduction in April 1990 of a
computerized system called Market by Price (MBP) which dramatically increased the level of pre-
trade transparency. These authors observe an increased price volatility (perhaps allowing for an
higher informational eﬃciency) and above all that the cost of trading does not reduce following the
reform. Although they give a diﬀerent interpretation to their empirical ﬁndings with respect to the
increased competition in information, we stress here the similarity with our theoretical conclusions.
The key to our result is twofold. Firstly the transparency of an electronic quotation system enables
brokers to observe the identities of other brokers submitting orders and therefore to acquire private
information as soon as it is used by someone to perform a (proﬁtable) trade: this provokes a direct
competition among insiders. Secondly we model asymmetries of information between traders in a very
natural way that accounts for diﬀerences in the quality of information which is treated as the main
strategic variable.
The issue of information revelation in ﬁnancial markets has long been studied in competitive
markets but it has taken a new start with Kyle (1985). He shows that the optimal behavior of a
monopolistic informed trader is to reveal information slowly so as to maintain a constant market
depth (until the last few periods). But, as reported by Cornell and Sirri (1992) and Meulbroek
(1992), private information can be disseminated among dozens of traders. Thus it makes sense to look
at oligopolistic competition among equally informed traders as done by Holden and Subrahmanyam
(1992) and Foster and Viswanathan (1993) among others. These later models have a Bertrand ﬂavor
since they treat information as an homogeneous good. Although the ensuing “rat race” yields a quite
eﬃcient price dynamic, this approach remains unsatisfactory due to the discrepancy existing between
the outcomes of the monopoly and duopoly settings.
Traders frequently disagree on the future value of an asset either because they have diﬀerent
2private information or because they interpret diﬀerently the same piece of news (due to diﬀerent
experience or education). Foster and Viswanathan (1996) (hereafter FV) pursue this venue and argue
that private information is a peculiar good, intrinsically non homogeneous and spread asymmetrically
among rational traders. Our present work starts from the same observation and yields similar results
on some grounds. However there are fundamental diﬀerences in the two approaches.
Firstly we study a non-anonymous electronic system where traders directly observe their com-
petitors orders while FV’s model rather applies to anonymous ﬂoor systems where informed traders
only observe the order ﬂow (like market makers) and their own orders. From a strategic point of view,
informed traders in FV do not compete one against the other but indirectly through the market maker.
Secondly we consider asymmetries in the quality of information (variance of private signals) while FV
use an identical variance of private signals. On the other hand these authors consider asymmetries of
opinions by allowing for any kind of initial correlation structure (agreement or disagreement) while
in our model there is always a positive correlation between signals (a form of agreement).
In defense of our choice, we believe that although traders process the same news diﬀerently they
should nevertheless agree on the direction of the stock variation (up or down) and disagree only with
respect on its magnitude.
In this article we analyze a two-stage game describing a centralized and order-driven market
with three kinds of agents: informed traders (hereafter insiders), liquidity traders and risk neutral
arbitrageurs. Insiders is a short hand for registered traders who can enjoy the information services
provided by the market organizer. We study a market with high transparency and no designated
market makers. Hence we assume that in each period of trade, the order book is electronically
collected and insiders observe the orders of each others. This degree of transparency in the order ﬂow
is present in some stock exchanges like for example the Toronto CATS and the order system for the
stocks quoted on the Euronext in Paris before 1998; moreover, most electronic systems display the 3
or 5 best bid and ask quotes together with the dealers identities. The insiders’ information therefore
consists of their observation of a signal correlated with the liquidation value of the asset, of the past
history of prices and all the individual orders. Insiders also observe the amount of liquidity trade
present in the market at each period.1 The competition between risk neutral arbitrageurs makes the
equilibrium price equal to the expected value of the asset given the observable order ﬂows (semi strong
price eﬃciency).
We characterize the set of equilibria in pure and linear strategies. A simple backward induction
argument shows that one should always reveal its information in the last period. We then enquire
about the incentives to reveal the private information in the ﬁrst stage. On the one hand, using
private information to trade with uninformed agents is beneﬁcial but, by doing this, an insider gives
1This is not allowed in Kyle (1985) and Holden & Subrahmanyam (1992) where insiders perfectly know the asset
value because the price would immediatly incorporate all the information. One can motivate our assumption by invoking
the possibility for the traders to estimate the liquidity order ﬂow during the pre-opening period.
3an advantage to its competitor for the last stage and further brings the price closer to its own estimate.
Both eﬀects reduce the proﬁt opportunities for the second period.
We show (as in Admati and Pﬂeiderer (1988)) that the amount of liquidity trade present on the
market can be considered as a “cake” to be divided between the insiders. If the second period cake is
much larger than the ﬁrst period one, then traders conceal their information in the ﬁrst period: the
size eﬀect predominates over the duopoly competition. Choosing a comparable liquidity volume across
periods we obtain other insightful results. If their private information is almost equally precise, the
two traders reveal their signal in the ﬁrst stage. However, if asymmetries are large, the better informed
trader conceals and the opponent reveals in the ﬁrst period. The better informed player is induced to
trade less aggressively on his information because his opponent can detect perfectly his move. The less
informed trader prefers to reveal his type immediately in order to exploit an informational advantage
that will not be relevant in the following stage for the presence of a better informed opponent. The
competition between asymmetric agents is not of the “Bertrand” kind because the information released
by the traders is non-homogeneous.
In equilibrium, the price informativeness increases in the second period and the depth of the market
reduces with time except when there is a strong information asymmetry leading the better informed
insider to wait. We can then predict that in highly transparent systems, the information of the better
quality comes to the market only at the latest stages, and the cost of trading increases before a public
announcement which is value-relevant. Notice that this predictions are indirectly veriﬁed by Foucault,
Moinas, Theissen (2002) in their observation of the pattern of the cost of trading in Euronext Paris
before and after the reform of April 2001 that made such a system anonymous.
The paper is organized as follows: in section 2 we present the two stage game and describe the
equilibrium concept. Section 3 tackles the main part of the analysis while in section 4 we present our
results on equilibrium revelation of information and on the liquidity and the informativeness of prices
in order to point out the diﬀerences of our model with the existing literature. Section 5 concludes.
2 A Model of Electronic Trading
In this section we ﬁrst introduce our model. We then proceed to highlight the diﬀerences with the
previous literature before deﬁning the equilibrium concept used for the solution of the game. We
conclude with an analysis of the case in which only one informed trader exists on the market (the
monopoly of information), that will be used as a benchmark to give some intuitions of the results in
the case of multiple informed traders.
2.1 Structure and notation
Consider a market for a risky asset where the exchanges occur during two rounds of trade between
three kinds of agents: informed traders, noise traders and risk neutral arbitrageurs.
4The risky asset has a random liquidation value v distributed according to the standard normal law
N(0,1). At the beginning of the ﬁrst trading round, insider i observes a private signal si = v + εi
where the error term εi has law N(0,τ−1
i ) and τi is interpreted as the ex-ante precision with which
the trader can guess the true value of v. We study the case of two information insiders.2 All random
variables are assumed to be independently distributed.
In each of the two periods of trade, all agents submit market orders to an electronic order system,
and this system creates automatically the order book. The system is fully non-anonymous, so that all
registered market participants can observe the identiﬁcation codes of every other trader. Therefore,
all the participants are able to identify the orders of each others. We also assume the presence of a
group of risk-neutral arbitrageurs who act as liquidity providers. They can observe each individual
order but they limit themselves to the information given by the total order ﬂow: indeed, they cannot
identify the informed orders, since they do not know who are the privately informed traders.3
At each stage t = 1,2, insiders choose the quantities they trade, qt,i and qt,j knowing their private
signals si and sj while liquidity traders submit an aggregated order ut distributed according to the
normal law N(¯ u,τ−1
t ). We normalize their average trade to ¯ u = 0 and assume that liquidity trading
is independent of all other random variables. Notice that the standard deviation 1/
√
τt is a measure
of the size of noise trading in stage t.4
Given the realized order ﬂow ωt = qt,i + qt,j + ut, the system electronically computes at the end
of each stage the price at which all orders are ﬁlled. At the end of the second period of trading,
the realized liquidation value of the asset is announced and holders of the asset are paid its realized
value. The public information at stage t = 1,2 is H1 = {ω1} and H2 = {ω1,ω2}.We denote Ht,i the
private information of insider i in stage t. The insider’s ex-post stage proﬁt is qt,i(v − pt) while the
ex-interim expectation, conditional on the private information Ht,i, is Πt,i = E [qt,i(v − pt) | Ht,i]. We
will consider also the ex-ante proﬁt obtained by integrating Πt,i with respect to the joint measure of
private signals and liquidity trade.
2.2 Relation to the existing literature
The diﬀerences between our ﬁndings and those of Foster and Viswanathan (1996) (hereafter FV)
originate in the statistical properties of the private informative signals received by the insiders. In our
setting the signal received by an insider is the realized liquidation value v plus a white noise ε . Hence,
the correlation between signals is always positive as opposed to FV. In other words, insiders do not have
diﬀerent “opinions” about the true value of the asset, they just receive information that is more or less
2Notation: i stands for trader 1 or 2 and j for the other trader. Whenever a formula is given for i only, the j formula
is obtained by interverting symbols i and j.
3Our view amounts to assume that arbitrageurs are bounded in their rationality: they do not try to infer from the
observation of the individual orders which is the informed one. In a market in which a large number of individual orders
is observed in each trading round, we believe such an assumption is not too restrictive.








5noisy. Yet as in FV, the covariance of the signals with v is the same: Cov(si,v) = Cov(sj,v) = V ar(v).










where the diagonal terms are diﬀerent as precisions diﬀer. The expected value of the asset given the
observation of the two private signals is













τi + τj + 1
and a simple average of the signals 1
2(si +sj) is not a suﬃcient statistic for the information known to
all insiders unlike in the approach of FV.
This observation implies that the learning process of the arbitrageurs is diﬀerent from that of
an insider: they can, at best, infer an average of the signals from the order ﬂow. Yet this statistic
has less predictive power than the information known to each single insider. This has two important
consequences: ﬁrst, the strategic interaction between insiders is much more complex than in FV. Each
insider has to optimally reply to the move of its informed opponent taking into account that the
latter and the market will derive diﬀerent statistics from his trade. Both learning processes have to
be considered in formulating the optimal informative trade. Second, as arbitrageurs will not be able
to infer precisely the individual signals (since they don’t know who are the insiders), the variance of v
given the whole history of prices and orders will still be positive, even after the second round of trade.
In the following subsections we proceed to illustrate ﬁrst the pricing reaction of the market to
the order ﬂow, then we describe the strategies used by insiders and ﬁnally, we analyze the optimal
revelation of information by an insider who has a monopolistic informational advantage, as in Kyle
(1985).
2.3 The Market Pricing Rule
Our task is to assess how the revelation of private information in the order ﬂow aﬀects the pricing
function of the market. It is relatively easy for the ﬁrst period because there is no information contained
in the previous day closing price, p0. The second period is more complex as arbitrageurs can make
inferences from the observation of both ω2 and ω1 which potentially contain private information.
The presence of risk-neutral arbitrageurs guarantees semi-strong price eﬃciency, so that pt =
E [v | Ht]. Now, since all random variables in our model are normal, the pricing rule is linear in each
period;5 hence we can write
pt(ωt,ωt−1) = µt(ωt−1) + λtωt for t = 1,2 (1)
where λt is the market aggressiveness (inverse of market depth) and µt the memory eﬀect (linear in
the previous period order book).
5This is usually stated as an assumption in the literature.
6We shall later show that the order ﬂows take the following functional forms:








According to the standard projection of normal variables, if ˜ x and ˜ y are independent with zero
mean, then E [˜ x/ ˜ x + ˜ y] =
V ar(˜ x)(˜ x+˜ y)
V ar(˜ x)+V ar(˜ y) . We apply this formula to ˜ x = λ1(ki + kj)v and ˜ y = ω1 −
E [ω1] − ˜ x in (2) to obtain:
E [v | ω1 − E [ω1]] =
ki + kj
λ1V ar(ω1)
(ω1 − E [ω1]). (4)
We can now use (1) and (4) in the eﬃcient price equation p1 = E [v | H1] to identify µ1 and λ1. We





































where it can be noted that the ex-ante precision of exogenous trade (τ1) negatively inﬂuences the
depth of the market, λ−1
1 .
In the following, we will measure the informational eﬃciency of the market by the (remaining)
variance of the asset value conditional on the information revealed. For the ﬁrst stage, we have
Σ1 ≡ E
h
(v − E [v | ω1])
2
i
= 1 − V ar(E [v | ω1]) as the conditional expectation is an orthogonal





Σ1 = 1 − ki − kj (6)
To ﬁnd λ2,µ2 and Σ2 we use the law of iterated expectations into (1) and the semi-strong price
eﬃciency (cf. (36) and (37) in appendix 5.1).
2.4 Insiders strategies and equilibrium concept
We now formally deﬁne the equilibrium concept and the strategy space of the insiders.
Due to the high degree of transparency of the electronic quotation system, insider i knows the
history of all trades whether their motivation was liquidity or private information. The order he
submits qt,i at period t thus depends on his forecast si of the realized value of v, on the trading
decisions of the other insider j, and on the induced equilibrium pricing rule. Indeed the insider is
aware that the market adjusts the sensitivity of its pricing rule according to the amount of information
forecasted to be released in equilibrium.
6The factor doesn’t matter since it will be shown that there is no memory eﬀect in the ﬁrst period i.e., E [ω1] = 0.
7Some important restrictive assumptions are necessary in order to be able to solve the model
analytically. Firstly, we make the standard assumption that insiders use strategies linear in their
private information i.e., qt,i(Ht,i) = αt,i + βt,iE [v | Ht,i]. Notice that this also implies that we do not
analyze equilibria in mixed strategies.
A second problem arises when considering the Bayesian inference process of insiders and arbi-
trageurs. It is diﬃcult to construct a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of the game where the strategy of
insider i at the second stage is required to be optimal not only when insider j plays his optimal strat-
egy in the ﬁrst period, but also for any other strategy. To construct such an equilibrium, we would
have to be able to rule out all possible deviations. Consider for example the following strategy for
insider j: in the ﬁrst stage, he uses his optimal β1,j, but pretends he received signal ˆ sj 6= sj (the
true one). Insider i can detect this individual trade and will wrongly infer ˆ sj, while the market will
construct the wrong statistic E [v | ω1(q1,j(ˆ sj))]. This deviation could in principle give higher proﬁts
to j in the second period, where both his opponents have been mislead. The main problem is that
in such an incomplete information game, some signalling activity between the two informed players
could arise, and we are not sure that truthful revelation is indeed the only equilibrium, at least if we
don’t construct beliefs out of the equilibrium path supporting it.
Hence, we assume that any misleading activity is ruled out from the strategy space: in this sense,
the equilibrium we characterize is restricted to what we call truthful revelation strategies7.
Allowing only for full revelation or concealing of the private signal, the second stage can start with
four possible information structures. Strategies in the ﬁrst stage denoted by σ1,i and σ1,j are either
to reveal R or conceal C. The information sets are therefore8:
I Only i reveals (σ1,i = R) ⇒ H2,i = {ω1,ω2,si},H2,j = {ω1,ω2,si,sj}.
I Only j reveals (σ1,j = R) ⇒ H2,i = {ω1,ω2,si,sj},H2,j = {ω1,ω2,sj}.
I No revelation (σ1,i = σ1,j = C) ⇒ H2,i = {ω1,ω2,si},H2,j = {ω1,ω2,sj}.
I Both reveal (σ1,i = σ1,j = R) ⇒ H2,i = {ω1,ω2,si,sj},H2,j = {ω1,ω2,si,sj}.
In the symmetric revelation case denoted RR, the second period is a Cournot duopoly with com-
plete information i.e., each pair {si,sj} deﬁnes a proper subgame. The game is solved for any couple
of given private signals in the space of linear strategies. When only trader i reveals his information in
stage one, denoted RC, trader j behaves as in the previous case, since he knows {si,sj}. In equilib-
rium, trader i, despite the fact that he does not know the signal sj, anticipates the rule q1,j(sj,si) used
by his opponent. Hence, we deal with a form of Stackelberg game. When no revelation has occurred,
(CC), traders play a game with incomplete information on both sides. Each trader has to optimize
against a rule and not against a single order.
7Studying only truthful revealing strategies implies that we will ﬁnd an upper bound in terms of informational
eﬃciency of the market. All our results should then be read keeping this caveat in mind.
8Observe that H2,i is always ﬁner than the observation of the total order ﬂow ω1 which can therefore be safely ignored
in the second stage calculations.
8An obvious consequence of the ﬁnite number of stages is that insiders have an incentive to use their
private information in stage 2, thus ω2 certainly conveys information about the underlying liquidation
value of the asset. Yet, if one or both insiders have revealed information during the ﬁrst stage, then
the order ﬂow ω1 is also an informative statistic for the market.
According to our restrictions on the strategy spaces, we analyze the 2 × 2 matrix game and for
any pair of strategies h ∈ {CC,RC,CR,RR}, the ex-ante global proﬁt is the sum of proﬁts obtained




Deﬁnition 1 A Bayesian-Nash equilibrium in linear, truthfully revealing strategies of the trading
game is a vector of strategies (σi,σj,p) such that:









t,i(ˆ σi,σj,p) | Ht,i,ωt−1,ωt
i
.
2. For any period t = 1,2, pt = E [e v | Ht].
2.5 The Monopoly Benchmark
We develop in full length the analysis of the monopoly of information i.e., the case of a single insider.
This will enable us to gain concision in presenting the various duopoly cases by concentrating on the
diﬀerences brought by strategic interaction into the key equations of this monopoly benchmark. We
drop indices i and j when referring to the monopoly. As explained before an insider can either conceal
his information in the ﬁrst stage or reveal it. We consider each case in turn before comparing the total
resulting payoﬀs.
2.5.1 Concealing
If the insider conceals his information during the ﬁrst period he places a market order q1 constant for
any private signal s he received. The ﬁrst stage order ﬂow ω1 = q1 + u1 is therefore non informative.
Hence the expected value of the asset conditional on the order ﬂow is E [v | ω1] = E [v | p0] = p0, the
closing price of the previous day which is normalized to zero (as it is assumed to be eﬃcient).
Arbitrage forces drive the equilibrium price p1 towards zero so that any q1 is indeed optimal for
the insider whose expected proﬁt is then ¯ ΠC
1 = 0. The intensity parameter in (2) is k = 0 and the noise
trading parameter is η1 = 1. We now use (5) with ki = kj = 0 to obtain the memory eﬀect µC
1 = 0,
the market aggressiveness λC
1 = 0 as well as the remaining variance of the asset value ΣC
1 = 1. No
information is enclosed in the order ﬂow so that the market has an inﬁnite depth and the variance of
the asset value remains at the previous day level.
It is obviously a dominant strategy for the insider to use (and reveal) its information in the last
period before the public announcement. Letting H2 be the information set of the insider, its second
9period proﬁt writes
Π2 = q2E [v − p2 | H2] (7)
where p2 = µ2+λ2(q2+u2) by (1). The FOC of proﬁt maximization is 2q2 = E [v | H2]/λ2−µ2/λ2−u2.
The projection theorem for normal random variables yields E [v | H2] = E [v | s] = τs
τ+1, hence the













2 = E [ω2] +ms/λ2+η2u2 so that the identiﬁcation
of the coeﬃcients yields m = τ
2(τ+1) and η2 = 1
2. The market depth obtained from (36) or (5) (if there is










τ+1 while the memory eﬀect is µC
2 = 0 (as shown in (37), µ2 is proportional to λC
1 ω1).
Rewriting the optimal order as qC







we observe that E [v − p2 | s] = λ2qC
2 (s); hence
we can substitute into (7) to obtain the expected proﬁt in the second stage, conditional on the private
signal,
¯ ΠC























2 and the independence of s and u2 to compute the ex-ante
















The complete payoﬀ is ¯ ΠC = ¯ ΠC
1 +¯ ΠC
2 and since ¯ ΠC
2 > 0 it was indeed optimal to reveal information
in the last stage.9
2.5.2 Revealing
If the monopolist insider decides to use and reveal immediately his private information then the ﬁrst























τ+1 − µ2 − u2λ2
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Unlike the previous case, qR










so that the conditional
proﬁt is ¯ ΠR
2 (s) = λR
2 qR




















































τi+1 the payoﬀ corresponding to the observation of a single signal. More information is always beneﬁcial in a
monopoly.
10which is roughly 80% of ¯ ΠR
1 = ¯ ΠC
2 (cf. equation (8)). The ﬁnal payoﬀ is ¯ ΠR = ¯ ΠR















2.5.3 Optimal revelation timing
Notice that in our model λR
2 < λR
1 i.e., the market becomes less reactive to the release of private infor-
mation in the second period; this is because the insider’s private information was partly impounded
into the ﬁrst period price. Although λR
2 < λR
1 would suggest that the insider proﬁt may increase in
the second period, the memory eﬀect plays a strong role in reversing this intuition since the actual
ranking is ¯ ΠR
2 < ¯ ΠR
1 .
Intuition would suggest that if the volume of liquidity trade is identical in the two periods (τ1 = τ2)
then the best strategy for a monopolist insider is to reveal immediately his signal in order to beneﬁt





Lemma 1 In a market where noise trading in the ﬁrst period is at least 20% of that in the second
period, the monopolist insider optimally chooses to reveal immediately its information.
3 The equilibria of the duopoly of information
3.1 Construction of the payoﬀs of the trading game
As we have illustrated in the monopoly benchmark, the revelation of information by the insider triggers
a reaction of the market, increasing the aggressiveness λ of the pricing rule. In addition to this eﬀect,
two competing insiders with positively correlated signals also have to take into account that revealing
at the ﬁrst stage gives their opponent an informational advantage in the second period: the trade-
oﬀ is then between using its own information immediately, getting a higher proﬁt in period 1 but
suﬀering tough competition in period 2, or concealing it, so that the proﬁt in stage 1 is lower but the
competition in 2 is softer.
To construct the payoﬀs of the game, and then the equilibrium strategies,10 we consider the four
possible combination of insiders behavior in the ﬁrst period:11 both conceal their signals (CC), i
reveals and j conceals (RC), the symmetric (CR) and ﬁnally both reveal (RR). In solving the game
by backward induction we shall develop the minimal amount of calculation in the body of the text
and defer complex computations to the appendices.
10We use backward induction as a solution concept to point out the strategic eﬀect of the information revelation, as
in Stackelberg competition. Notice however that, since the strategies we allow are markovian, and the state of the game
is the only relevant statistic at the beginning of the second period, this solution concept is equivalent to the dynamic
programming method more used in the microstructure literature (see for ex. Foster and Viswanathan (1996)).
11Recall that revealing its own information in the second period is a dominant strategy.
113.1.1 Symmetric Concealing (CC)
In this subsection we derive the optimal trading strategies conditional on the decision to conceal
information in the ﬁrst stage.
First period market outcome In this CC case, insiders place market orders independent of their
private signals. The ﬁrst stage order ﬂow contains no information on the underlying value of the asset.
The equilibrium price is p0 (normalized to zero) so that any ﬁxed quantity is an optimal order for an
insider. The case is exactly analogous to the monopolist setting with no revelation in the ﬁrst stage.
The commitment by informed traders to conceal their information drives their ﬁrst period proﬁts to
zero on average.
Second period market outcome The second stage starts with an empty public information set
H2 = {∅} and private information set H2,i = {si}. It is like a ﬁrst stage where insiders immediately
exploit their information.
The expected proﬁt for insider i conditional on H2,i is Π2,i(si) = q2,i(si)E [v − p2 | H2,i]. The FOC
of maximization is altered, with respect to the monopoly case, by the presence of the competitor’s




(λ2E [v | H2,i] − E [q2,j | H2,i] − λ2µ2 − u2). (10)
We use the projection theorem for normal random variables stating E [E [v | H2,j] | H2,i] =
τj
τj+1E [v | H2,i]
and the fact that trader j’s strategy is linear in the form q2,j(H2,j) = α2,j +β2,jE [v | H2,j] to identify


















λ2(τj + 2)(τi + 1)
(3τiτj + 4τj + 4τi + 4)
. (12)














Given the form of the order ﬂow assumed in (3), we can identify the coeﬃcients of the various
independent random variables to obtain mi =
(τj+2)τi
3τiτj+4τj+4τi+4 and η2 = 1
3.
Dynamic interaction In the ﬁrst period there is no revelation so that µCC





3τiτj+4τj+4τi+4.12 By considering symmetrically informed insiders (τi = τj = τ) we observe that
12Z(τi,τj) = 4(τi + 1 + τj)(τi + τj)+τiτj (2τiτj + 5τj + 5τi) is found by plugging mi =
(τj+2)τi














τ+1 meaning that competition among insiders increases the market
reactiveness to strategic orders (with respect to the monopoly case).13
We are now able to compute the expected proﬁts of the players. From (13), we derive the equilib-
rium orders








τ2Z(τi,τj) si − u2

(14)
and like in the monopoly case, q2,i(si) = λ2E [v − p2 | si], so that the proﬁt conditional on private
information ΠCC
2,i (si) = q2,i(si)2/λCC
2 . The ex-ante proﬁt is then
ΠCC
i = ΠCC






(τj + 2)2 (1 + τi)τi + Z (τi,τj)




We can verify that the payoﬀ increases with noise trading volume (
∂ ΠCC
i




∂ τi > 0) and with the quality of the opponent’s information (
∂ ΠCC
i
∂ τj > 0) except
when being seriously disavantaged (τi < 0.5), this last statement using a graphical representation.
Notice also that a greater precision on information in the sense of τi > τj pays more i.e., ΠCC
i > ΠCC
j .
The residual variance of the asset is ΣCC
2 = E
h






which is a convex decreasing function of both precisions.
3.1.2 Asymmetric Behavior (RC or CR)
One player conceals his private information in stage 1 to better use it in stage 2. In what we call the
RC case, trader i reveals optimally while trader j conceals optimally. Since ΠCR
i (τj,τi) = ΠRC
j (τi,τj)
we need only compute both traders payoﬀs in the RC case.


















where q1,j is independent of sj because insider j voluntary ignores his private information at stage 1.
Nevertheless he optimally uses the noise trade u1 by trading against it. The order ﬂow equation (3)
is now ω1 − E [ω1] = 1
λ1 ki (v + εi) + u1
3 , thus we derive ki = τi
2(1+τi), kj = 0 and η1 = 1
3. Applying













τ+1 (monopolist insider). Although the revealing insider acts exactly





2) augments the agressiveness of the market rule. As expected, λRC
1 is increasing in the revealed
13The inequality is equivalent to 18 >
(3τ+2)2
(τ+1)2 which is true since (3τ + 2)
2 < 9(τ + 1)
2 .
13precision τi because the more precise the signal, the more aggressive the revealing trader and the more
aggressive the market response which ultimately reduces the depth of the market.
We now compute the expected proﬁts for the players. Integrating (18) into optimal demands (23)
and (24), we get the ex-interim proﬁts
ΠRC





























1 and the fact that si and u2 are independent to compute






















. Moreover, the revealing trader is earning more than the concealing one
who nevertheless takes advantage of the quality of the information revealed (ΠRC
1,j increases with τi).
Second period market outcome At the beginning of stage 2, information sets are H2,i = {si}
and H2,j = {sj,si} so that E [E [v | H2,j] | H2,i] = E [v | H2,i] = siτi
τi+1 and E [E [v | H2,i] | H2,j] =
E [v | H2,j] =
siτi+sjτj
τj+τi+1 .14
The FOC for trader i is still
2λ2q2,i(Hi) = E [v | H2,i] − µ2 − λ2u2 − λ2E [qj | H2,i] (21)
but as trader j knows H2,i, its FOC reads
2λ2q2,j(H2,j) = E [v | H2,j] − µ2 − λ2u2 − λ2q2,i(H2,i) (22)
We proceed very much like in section 3.1.1 to derive the insiders orders. Trader i takes into account












The presence of another insider (j) forces the revealing insider (i) to trade less on its information
in the second period (factor 1
3 against 1
2), for an equal market depth in both periods. This is an eﬀect
we already saw when comparing the CC case with the monopoly.
We can now solve for the more informed trader j substituting (23) in (22)
q2,j(si,sj) =
(siτi + sjτj)
2λ2(τj + τi + 1)
−
siτi








14We use the normal variables linear decomposition property presented p 21 by equations (31) and (32).
15We could also posit qi = a1 + b1si and qj = a2 + b2si + b3sj and derive the coeﬃcients from the FOCs.
14Dynamic interaction Having solved the price equilibrium of both stages, we can ﬁnd out the up-
dating performed by the market in the second period. Using the equilibrium values of ki,kj,η1,mi,mj
and η2 we obtain λRC




4(τi+τj+1)(1+τi) (cf. (36) in appendix). The positiveness indicates
that the market spreads its reactiveness towards adverse selection over the two periods of trade.
The novelty of the RC case with respect to the CC case is the memory eﬀect within the second





9 which aﬀects the second period proﬁts. The
ex-interim proﬁts in stage two are
ΠRC
2,i (si) = λRC














2,j (sj,si) = λRC




































As intuition suggests, the insider who beneﬁted from the revelation of its competitor in the ﬁrst
period earns more than him in the second stage, since he is better informed than its competitor,
possessing two informative signals (ΠRC
2,j − ΠRC
2,i ∝ 81τj).
Comparing the total expected payoﬀs for i when insider j conceals we can state a ﬁrst result:
Lemma 2 In a market where noise trading in the ﬁrst period is at least 40% of that in the second
period, an insider facing a concealing insider decides to reveal immediately its information.























is a polynomial fraction F of τi and τj with






















As the latter expression is bounded above by 0.4 we obtain the lemma. 
3.1.3 Symmetric Revealing (RR)
In this ﬁnal case, traders play in the ﬁrst period as if they were in the second period without any
previously revealed information. Accordingly, the analysis proceeds in a relative straightforward way.
The second stage analysis of the CC case yields immediately the ﬁrst stage of the RR case by changing
τ2 into τ1 i.e., ΠRR
1,i (τ1,τi,τj) = ΠCC
2,i (τ1,τi,τj). We obtain ki > 0,kj > 0 and η1 > 0 i.e., traders
15use their information against the market and also trade against the liquidity traders. The market
aggressiveness is positive (λRR
1 > 0) and there is no history eﬀect (µ1 = 0).16
In the second stage, the private information sets are H2,i = H2,j = {sj,si}. Using the above














 siτi + sjτj
τj + τi + 1




we are able to identify mi = τi
3(τj+τi+1) and η2 = 1
3. This leads to a complex formulae for λRR
2 , µRR
2 and
the ex-ante proﬁt ΠRR
2,i . The overall expected payoﬀ ΠRR
i = ΠRR
1,i + ΠRR
2,i is an increasing and concave
function of the precision of its own signal.
3.2 The revelation of information in equilibrium
The previous analysis allows us to characterize the equilibrium of our trading game. The existing lit-
erature (Kyle (1989), Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992), Foster and Viswanathan (1993) and (1996))
has shown that increasing competition between informed traders leads to more eﬃcient prices. The
following proposition is the central result of the paper: it shows for which parameters of private signal
precision (τi, τj) and volume of liquidity trade (τ1, τ2) one of the insiders prefers not to reveal his
own information in the ﬁrst period at equilibrium.
Let us deﬁne z =
q
τ2
τ1 as the ratio between the ﬁrst period expected volume of noise trade and
the second period one.
Theorem 3 The equilibrium outcome of the duopoly game depends on the precisions of insiders’
signals and the relative size z of noise trading in the ﬁrst period as compared to the second period:
(i) If z ≥ 60% then both insiders reveal immediately (“rat race”);
(ii) If z ≤ 20% then everybody waits (“waiting game”);
(iii) If 20% ≤ z ≤ 60% the equilibrium is asymmetric:
(a) if precisions are dissimilar the better informed insider conceals his information while the other
one reveals.
(b) if precisions are similar one insider conceals his information while the other reveals.
Proof: Algebraic manipulations enable us to show that ΠRR
i > ΠCR
i ⇔ z > T(τi,τj) where T is
a polynomial fraction of precisions. The ﬁgure below represents the surfaces T(τi,τj) (on top) and
S(τi,τj) (below) where the surface S(τi,τj) represents the set of z such that ΠRC
i > ΠCC
i ⇔ z >
S(τi,τj).




1,i (this diﬀerence is a
polynomial in τi and τj with positive coeﬃcients). Furthermore, since trader j is always revealing, the better informed




1,i increases with τj. It can also
be noted that Π
RR
1,i (0,τj) = Π
CR
1,i (τi,τj) i.e., revealing an empty information is like not revealing.
16It is immediate to see that the equilibrium is RR if z > max(T(τi,τj),T(τj,τi)) i.e., when both





i for i = 1,2 thus revelation is a dominant strategy for both insiders.
A similar but reversed reasoning applies if z < min(S(τi,τj),S(τj,τi)) i.e., when (τi,τj,τ2) and
(τj,τi,τ2) both lie below the S map. The concealment of private information is a dominante strategy:
the unique equilibrium is C,C.
Finally we have to consider intermediate situations where points are in between the two maps:
1. If max(S(τi,τj),S(τj,τi)) < z < min(T(τi,τj),T(τj,τi)) i.e., when both points are in between
the maps S and T then both RC and CR are equilibria i.e., no one imitates C but given that
someone plays R the other one does not wish to imitate.
2. If (τi,τj,τ2) lies below the S map (right side of the ﬁgure) but (τi,τj,τ2) is above (left side of
the ﬁgure) then insider i will never reveal and insider j reveals against a concealing opponent.
Now this is enough to fully characterize the equilibrium which is CR.
3. If (τi,τj,τ2) lies between the T and S maps while (τi,τj,τ2) is above the T map, then insider j
will always reveal but insider i will conceal against a revealing opponent. Hence the equilibrium











Figure 1: The S and T surfaces
A few comments on Theorem 3 are in order. The volume of liquidity trade on the equilibrium
revelation of information has already been pointed out by Admati and Pﬂeiderer (1988) in order book
markets (the “size” eﬀect of liquidity trade). As intuition suggests, the bigger the volume of trade
present in the market for hedging or other liquidity reasons, the higher the proﬁt insiders can earn
trading on their information signal. Hence, if stage 2 is signiﬁcantly more liquid than stage 1, traders
have an incentive to hide their information in order to exploit it successfully in the last stage. Let
17us stress that such an ineﬃcient release of information can arise also in highly transparent markets if
the trading day involves moments of low and high activity. This is the case for instance in European
stock exchanges at the opening of American markets.
For high levels of z or comparable liquidity trade among periods, our model displays what Holden
and Subrahmanyam (1992) call the “rat race”: if a well informed insider decides to reveal his signal,
then the other insider also reveals. This happens because revealing a good piece of information
generates a strong market reaction which will dramatically reduce future proﬁts. Hence there is no
more gain to wait and revealing becomes the best reply to adopt.
The volume of liquidity trade across periods is not the only equilibrium driver. For intermediate
levels of z, the diﬀerence in the signal quality matters. When an insider with a low quality signal
decides to reveal it, a better informed opponent conceals his own in equilibrium. For the badly informed
insider, it is intuitive that using his information in a period in which he is the sole insider is optimal (the
market rule is not too aggressive since his signal is imprecise); this ﬁrst period advantage of revealing
his information more than compensate the second period loss. For the better informed insider the
trade-oﬀ is more complex. Revealing his information in the ﬁrst period would certainly proﬁt in the
same period, but it would turn his opponent into a copy of himself for the second period: the opponent
would then play aggressively on this acquired information in the second period, reducing dramatically
the payoﬀ for the ﬁrst insider. If the size of the second period market is large enough, revealing at the
ﬁrst stage is not a best reply for the better informed insider.
The main practical conclusion we can draw from Theorem 3 is that in electronic and transparent
order books, eﬃcient revelation of information takes place only during trading phases with a high level
of noise arriving to the market. In less liquid phases, only very imprecise information is revealed to
the market. This eﬀect is a consequence of the transparent microstructure of the exchanges, and it
is not present in previous model as in Foster and Viswanathan (1996), where insiders wait to reveal
their signals only when these are negatively correlated among themselves.
3.3 Informational eﬃciency and liquidity of the market
The main motivation to study a diﬀerent microstructure of exchanges and a diﬀerent information
structure from the existing literature builds on the consequences that these two elements induce on the
equilibrium liquidity dynamics and the degree of price eﬃciency. We describe these dynamics pointing
out the diﬀerence with the predictions of existing works, especially Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992)
and Foster and Viswanathan (1996). With this comparison, we can better understand the eﬀect of the
particular asymmetry of information assumed here, as well as the eﬀect of the strategic interaction
between insiders in a quotation system with extreme transparency.
The degree of price eﬃciency is given by Σt, the residual variance after the information publicly
revealed has been impounded into the price. The following corollary is proved in the appendix:
18Corollary 4 In any equilibrium of the game, price informativeness increases in the second period, i.e.




2 . The informativeness





It is readily observed that the second period of the game is informative, under any condition,
since the insiders will then have the last possibility to trade on a better position than the public.
Yet, the diﬀerence in the signals quality can induce an equilibrium RC in which case some relevant
information is not impounded in the ﬁrst period price p1; this negatively impacts the informativeness
of the market.
The liquidity of the market, measured here by the price sensitivity λ (inverse of market depth)
gives us an idea of the cost of trading: a very thin market (high λ) generates a high cost of trading via
the eﬀect that individual trading has on price. It is immediate to see that whatever the equilibrium,
the market depth is never constant across periods as opposed to the monopolist case of Kyle (1985)
but similarly to the rest of the literature of competition among insiders. Since the degree of correlation
between signals and the length of the game are both ﬁxed, we can make some comparative statics
analysis changing the precisions τi and τj.






τ2λ2. The sensitivity of the market pricing rule is likely to decrease with time since









1 for all possible combinations of precision parameters (cf. Appendix 5.2).











9−5τi and τi ≤ 9
5.
Corollary 5 A strong asymmetry of information which leads to an asymmetric equilibrium pattern
of revelation can generate higher trading costs in the second period in which most of the information
revelation occurs.
As for comparison of the market sensitivity across equilibria we may observe that λRC
2 > λRR
2 ; this
is simply because the second period in the RC equilibrium is the moment where most information is
revealed to the market thereby generating a strong reaction. In the ﬁrst period the reverse inequality
λRC
1 < λRR
1 holds17 since it is the moment where most information is revealed to the market in the
play of the RR equilibrium triggering an intense response from the market.
We may say that the trading cost is higher the greater the revelation of private information. This
eﬀect is well known in the literature: in equilibria with high adverse selection, the cost of trading is
higher. Yet as shown in Corollary 5, an ineﬃcent pattern of information revelation may occur making





1 can hold true but only if it is the best informed insider who reveals and it is been shown
that this does not happen in equilibrium.
19An increasing sensitivity factor λt is also obtained by Foster and Viswanathan (1996), but only
when the information of the insiders is negatively correlated which is not the case here. The reason
for this result in Foster and Viswanathan (1996) is that informed trader i makes a small trade in the
ﬁrst period as he thinks that informed trader j is pulling the stock price in the wrong direction and
perceive the possibility of making large proﬁts in the future by postponing its trade (that otherwise
would pull the price in the “right” direction immediately).
In our model the rationale is diﬀerent; the player who receives the most valuable information (that
is the most precise signal), prefers to wait to post a trade dependent on that signal, since he knows
that in the second period he will be able to update his own information much better than the average
(i.e. the market makers). Indeed he will possess a high informational advantage then, not having
revealed his signal to the opponent. This waiting behavior enhances a more aggressive pricing rule by
the market makers in the second period. Notice that our result arises from a strategic interaction, and
it is not the consequence of a statistical characteristic of the model. We may interpret the competition
in information as a competition between oligopolist with diﬀerent cost structures where the most
eﬃcient acts as a leader, taking a ﬁrst mover advantage.
Using the terminology of Foster and Viswanathan (1996), we can conclude that even if the insiders
have the same opinion about the value of an asset, two eﬀects arise: a competition eﬀect (“rat race”)
and a strategic leadership eﬀect (“waiting game”): when the quality of the information signals is
similar across insiders, the ﬁrst eﬀect prevails, otherwise we can observe the second phenomenon.
4 Conclusion
In the studies that address the problem of aggregation of information by equilibrium prices, the role of
asymmetries between informed traders has been rarely analyzed. The results of Kyle (1985), Holden
and Subrahmanyam (1992) consider the equilibrium in a centralized, order-driven continuous ﬁnancial
market with a monopolist of information or more competitors with the same information. Foster and
Viswanathan (1996) study the competition between asymmetrically informed traders, but consider a
signal space where insiders receive signals with the same precision but with some positive or negative
correlation.
In this article we have shown that the role of asymmetries is crucial in order to assess the eﬃciency
properties of prices. We have studied the strategic interaction between insiders who are able to observe
the orders of each other, as in transparent electronic order-book markets such as the Toronto Stock
Exchange. In our model this feature can induce a slow process of information revelation if the private
signals, even being positively correlated, have highly diﬀerent precisions. We characterize the linear,
pure strategies equilibrium set as a function of the precision of private signals and the volume of
liquidity trade present on the market. Keeping aside the inﬂuence of the latter we show that the more
precise the signal, the lower the incentive to reveal it at the ﬁrst stage. Yet the optimal response
20of a better informed trader can be to hide its own information during the ﬁrst stage. Asymmetric
equilibria hence arise if the insides have considerably diﬀerent precision. In the symmetric case, we
ﬁnd the result of Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992) as a special case.
The higher transparency structure of electronic exchanges causes then a sophisticated interaction
between informed traders, and the overall eﬀect on the amount of information incorporated into prices
can be negative.
Our result is also supported by the empirical evidence of Madhavan, Porter and Weaver (2000)
who observed an increase in trading costs in the Toronto CATS after the reform of 1990 that increased
the transparency in that market structure. The same result, but concerning a market which became
anonymous, is described by Foucault, Moinas and Theissen (2002) about the reform of April 2001 in
the Euronext Paris system.
5 Appendix
5.1 Second Period Market pricing
We derive here the market marker pricing rule in the second period depending on the order ﬂow ω1
and ω2. For normal variables the conditional expectation is a linear function of the observations, thus
p2 = E [v | ω1,ω2] = a1ω1 + a2ω2 (30)
and by the law of iterated expectations, we have
E [v | ω1] = E [E [v | ω1,ω2] | ω1] = a1ω1 + a2E [ω2 | ω1] (31)
E [v | ω2] = E [E [v | ω1,ω2] | ω2] = a2ω2 + a1E [ω1 | ω2] (32)
To solve (31), we use (2) and (3) to write
E [ω2 | ω1] = E [λ2(mi + mj)v | ω1] + E [λ2miεi | ω1] + E [λ2mjεj | ω1] + E [η2u2 | ω1]
=
λ2(mi+mj)
λ1(ki+kj) E [λ1(ki + kj)v | ω1] + λ2mi
λ1ki E [λ1kiεi | ω1] +
λ2mj
















where Q ≡ (mi + mj)(ki + kj) + kimiτ−1
i + kjmjτ−1
j (33)









Q . Symmetrically, (32) leads to a1 =
λ1(mi+mj−a2λ2V ar(ω2))
Q . Solving this
system yields
a1 = λ1
Q(mi + mj) − (ki + kj)λ2
2V ar(ω2)




(ki + kj)(Q − (mi + mj))
Q2 − (ki + kj)λ2
2V ar(ω2)
(35)
21Combining the linear market pricing rule p2(ω1,ω2) = µ2 +ω2λ2 with (30) we obtain µ2 +ω2λ2 =
a1ω1 + a2ω2. Identifying the coeﬃcients, we derive µ2 = a1ω1and λ2 = a2. Hence from (35) we
get λ2
















τ2 we ﬁnally obtain
λ2











Notice that when ki and kj tend to zero, Q and Q2/(ki + kj) tend also to zero, thus (36) is the
exact counterpart to (5) the market depth in the ﬁrst stage. We can also simplify (34) to obtain
µ2 = a1ω1 =
Q(mi + mj + ki + kj − Q) − (mi + mj)(ki + kj)
Q(ki + kj) − (mi + mj)(ki + kj)
(kisi + kjsj + λ1η1u1) (37)
which is nil whenever no information is revealed in stage one (ki = kj = 0 and λ1 = 0).
Using E [v | ω1,ω2] = a1ω1 + a2ω2 we are able to compute
ΣRR












0 ≤ 6(τi + τj + 1)(1 + τi)(τi + 2) − 2(1 + τi)
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
= 8τ2
i + 4τi + 4τ3
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